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Religion, Constitutionalism, and Ethos
Neil Siegel*

In a little more than two pages in a law review, Hannah Pitkin once offered a deeply
penetrating account of the nature and function of the United States Constitution. While jurists
and commentators have long insisted that the Constitution derives its authority from its status as
hard law,1 Pitkin suggested that the authority of the Constitution flows in important part from its
status as the embodiment of our “fundamental nature as a people,” our national “ethos,” which
“is sacred and demands our respectful acknowledgement.”2 By this she meant that the
Constitution commands authority because it expresses enduring social values. Thus Woodrow
Wilson insisted that “the Constitution of the United States is not a mere lawyers’ document: it is
a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.”3 Likewise, Franklin Roosevelt
invoked the “original broad concept of the Constitution as a layman’s instrument of
government.”4 By such statements, these Presidents meant that the Constitution must be
understood as an expression of the deepest cultural values of our nation.5
Supreme Court Justices also invoke the authority of the Constitution as ethos.6 For
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist supported his conclusion that the Constitution allows voluntary
recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools by looking to certain significant events
*

Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke Law School.
See, e.g., William W. Van Alstyne, The Idea of the Constitution as Hard Law, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 174,
179 (1987) (championing the ideal “of the constitution as hard law, law written in virtually capital letters (LAW),
law as meaning reliable law.”).
2
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 169 (1987).
3
WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1908).
4
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, The Constitution of the United States Was a Layman’s Document, Not a
Lawyer’s Contract (Sept. 17, 1937), in 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 353
(Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1941).
5
See Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles,
Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1473, 1501 (2007).
6
For a discussion of the ethos conception of constitutional authority and how it interacts with other
conceptions, see generally ROBERT C. POST, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in ROBERT POST,
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995).
1

in American history—specifically, President Washington’s first inaugural address and
Thanksgiving proclamation, President Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address and second inaugural
address, President Wilson’s 1917 request for a declaration of war against Germany, President
Franklin Roosevelt’s first inaugural address, General Eisenhower’s “Order of the Day” on DDay, the initial appearance of the motto “In God We Trust” on the country’s currency during the
Civil War, and the opening proclamation of the Marshal of the U.S. Supreme Court, which dates
back at least to 1827.7 In Chief Justice Rehnquist’s view, “[a]ll of these events strongly suggest
that our national culture allows public recognition of our Nation’s religious history and
character.”8
Rehnquist’s understanding of the Establishment Clause was radically different from
Justice Brennan’s. Yet Brennan agreed with Rehnquist’s implicit premise that the content of our
national character confers constitutional authority:
[T]he Constitution is not a static document whose meaning on every detail is
fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers. We have recognized in a
wide variety of constitutional contexts that the practices that were in place at the
time any particular guarantee was enacted into the Constitution do not necessarily
fix forever the meaning of that guarantee. . . . [T]he Members of the First
Congress should be treated . . . as the authors of a document meant to last for the
ages. Indeed, a proper respect for the Framers themselves forbids us to give so
static and lifeless a meaning to their work.9
While Rehnquist and Brennan disagreed about the pace at which the American ethos evolves in
history, they nonetheless agreed that this ethos partially established the authority of the
Constitution. Pitkin’s understanding of constitutional authority thus finds support in the
language favored by some influential Presidents and Justices.
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If Pitkin is right that our Constitution is not just what we do, but who we are—not just
how we strive to (re)constitute ourselves,10 but how we are already constituted11—then the
general subject of religion and constitutionalism encompasses a basic problem for progressive
constitutionalists who believe in a wall of separation between church and state—who, with
Justice Ginsburg, believe that “the aim of the Establishment Clause is genuinely to uncouple
government from church.”12 No doubt a separationist approach, one that maintains a secular
public space,13 has substantial virtues. Among other things, it disables government from
threatening the equal social status of citizens who are deeply alienated by the religious practices
advanced, endorsed, or coerced by government. But this virtue, although considerable, does not
address the problem I have in mind.
The problem, in short, is that the American people tend to be strikingly religious. What
is more, our “fundamental nature as a people”14 seems partially defined by a strong commitment
to the public affirmation of religious belief.15 This facet of the American ethos finds expression
even in the judicial opinions of certain “liberal” Justices. Whether and to what extent such
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expression is normatively acceptable—maybe even required to a certain extent—is the difficult
question that progressive constitutionalists face.

I.
One does not need to look hard to find evidence of the pervasive role of religion in public
and private life in America. Much social science research establishes that Americans are very
religious in absolute terms and uncommonly religious relative to inhabitants of other
economically developed societies. For example, Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We?,16 however
forcefully it has been criticized in various ways, compiles data that seems difficult to dismiss:
Overwhelming majorities of Americans affirm religious beliefs. When asked in
1999 whether they believed in God or a universal spirit, or neither, 86 percent of
those polled said they believed in God, 8 percent in a universal spirit, and 5
percent in neither. When asked in 2003 simply whether they believed in God or
not, 92 percent said yes. In a series of 2002-2003 polls, 57 percent to 65 percent
of Americans said religion was very important in their life, 23 percent to 27
percent said fairly important, and 12 percent to 18 percent said not very
important. Seventy-two percent to 74 percent said they believed in life after death,
while 17 percent said they did not.17
Huntington also offers robust support for his comparative claim that “Americans rank . . . among
the most religious people in the world and differ dramatically in their high level of religiosity
from the people of other economically developed countries.”18 For example, America is “a
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glaring exception” to the generally inverse relationship that exists between the level of religious
commitment in a country and the country’s level of economic development.19
For more qualitative but no less revealing evidence, one might consider the many ways in
which our (liberal Democratic) President speaks about religion. He seems to go out of his way to
stress his religious faith and his belief in God. For example, in his Inaugural Address, President
Obama underscored the “God-given promise that all are equal” and stated that “God calls on us
to shape an uncertain destiny.”20 He also referenced “God’s grace upon us” before ending with
“God bless you” and “God bless the United States of America.”21 He even invoked “the words
of Scripture” that “the time has come to set aside childish things.”22 As Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion in Newdow suggests,23 President Obama was following the public practice
of many a previous President.

II.
It is easy to offer many examples of instances in which the “conservative” Justices on the
contemporary Court viewed robust symbolic expressions of religious belief as compatible with
the Establishment Clause. More striking for present purposes are the instances in which the
“liberals” allow accommodation of religious beliefs, either by not deciding certain Establishment
Clause questions or by deciding them in a particular way.
Consider, for example, the prudential standing holding in Elk Grove Unified School
District v. Newdow.24 The Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Stevens and joined by
19
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Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, held that respondent Michael Newdow could not
challenge the inclusion of the words “under God” in recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance at his
daughter’s public elementary school. The Court so concluded based on a novel “prudential”—
that is, not constitutionally required—standing theory. Specifically, Justice Stevens wrote these
words for the Court:
In our view, it is improper for the federal courts to entertain a claim by a
plaintiff whose standing to sue is founded on family law rights that are in dispute
when prosecution of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is
the source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing. When hard questions of domestic
relations are sure to affect the outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court
to stay its hand rather than reach out to resolve a weighty question of federal
constitutional law. . . . We conclude that, having been deprived under California
law of the right to sue as next friend, Newdow lacks prudential standing to bring
this suit in federal court.25
Chief Justice Rehnquist countered that “the Court may have succeeded in confining this novel
principle almost narrowly enough to be, like the proverbial excursion ticket—good for this day
only.”26 Justice O’Connor also would have reached the merits and affirmed the constitutionality
of policies providing for the recitation of the Pledge in public schools.27
Many commentators have sided with the Chief Justice, suggesting that the Court created
limits on its own authority in order to have its cake and eat it too: The Ninth Circuit’s decision
striking down the local school district’s Pledge-recitation policy is no longer law, yet the
Supreme Court did not have to say what the law is, potentially setting off a political firestorm—
and quite possibly triggering a constitutional amendment—during an election year.28 The Chief
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Justice’s criticism that the Court was fashioning a prudential standing rule essentially “for this
day only,” a charge the majority did not seriously dispute, suggests that the Court’s opinion will
have the generative force of a rock. In the meantime—that is, since the decision was handed
down in 2004—students in public schools around the country may recite the words “under God”
in the Pledge without any Establishment Clause impediment imposed by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
A pair of recent Ten Commandments cases provides another illuminating example. In
McCreary County, Kentucky v. ACLU of Kentucky,29 and Van Orden v. Perry,30 the Court held
5-4 that the McCreary County Ten Commandments displays in county courthouses violated the
Establishment Clause but that the Van Orden monument, a large monolith that had long stood on
the grounds of the Texas statehouse, did not.31 Only Justice Breyer was in the majority in both
cases, and his narrow concurrence in the judgment was decisive in Van Orden. Breyer declared
that he was acting to reduce the “divisiveness” that Ten Commandments cases generate.32 He
wrote that “to reach a contrary conclusion here, based primarily on the religious nature of the
tablets’ text would, I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in
our Establishment Clause traditions.”33 Breyer sent a strong signal that advocates of church-state
separation should not challenge longstanding displays and that their ideological adversaries
should not build new ones.34
In both Newdow and Van Orden, certain “liberal” Justices seem (either implicitly or
explicitly) to be registering the constitutional relevance of the religious commitments of most
a dilemma for the four liberals and Kennedy. A decision striking out ‘under God’ would have provoked an electionyear firestorm, perhaps even a constitutional amendment.”).
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Americans and to be incorporating those commitments into the grounds of judicial decision.
Breyer’s opinion in Van Orden, which states the law for the time being,35 was more transparent
than the approach taken by the Court in Newdow. But in both instances the authoritative opinion
conceived of law as an institution that must account for the conditions of its own legitimation.36
In both instances the professional articulation (or nonarticulation) of constitutional law by the
Court was partially shaped by the religious commitments of the American public.

III.
I have so far described some evidence that supports my reading of the American ethos on
the general role of religion in public life, and I have further described two instances in which
“liberal” Justices seem to read the American ethos in much the same way and to deem it relevant
to the execution of their judicial responsibilities. I do not think what I have written so far should
be regarded as particularly controversial, although I may be wrong about that. Regardless, the
normative questions that follow are another kettle of fish. There is no shortage of commentators
who perceive much to admire in the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Newdow,37 and no shortage who
condemn Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the judgment in Van Orden.38 If, however, one agrees
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with Pitkin that our “fundamental nature as a people”39 confers constitutional authority, then
such criticism may not tell the whole story.
To be sure, strong doctrinal arguments call into question the Court’s handling of
Newdow and Van Orden, although I will not rehearse them at length here. Suffice it to say that
Pledge policies call for the profession of a religious belief in monotheism in a sensitive context
(public schools) and by impressionable people (children). The setting, moreover, can be highly
coercive in light of peer pressure, despite the formal voluntariness of the practice. In fact, the
various religious organizations that recoiled at the Ninth Circuit’s decision were unwittingly
supporting the plausibility of the result that the court of appeals reached. If the Pledge were as
secular as the government argued, there would have been little reason for religious groups to be
so upset. It was instructive to hear the Solicitor General’s secular characterization of the Pledge
at oral argument in Newdow at the very moment that protesters were praying outside the Court.40
As for Van Orden, the monument on the statehouse grounds was large (6 feet high and 3
feet wide) and the words “I AM the LORD thy God” were written on it in clearly visible letters.
This display, too, seemed like an endorsement of religion—and specifically, of the existence of
(one) God—by the state. Fairly applied, the Lemon test,41 Justice O’Connor’s endorsement
test,42 and the coercion test43 each likely would lead to the invalidation of the Pledge policy, and
the Ten Commandments display at issue in Van Orden likely would flunk the Lemon and
endorsement tests.
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Doctrinal arguments, however, obviously cannot account for where the doctrine comes
from, nor can they determine when it should change. Strong doctrinal arguments were available
to indict legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers,44 yet the pull of history and ethos
overwhelmed those arguments in the view of the Court. If the authority of our Constitution
flows partly from who we are as a people and not entirely from its status as LAW, then it may be
of some constitutional relevance that the overwhelming majority of Americans would object
strenuously to excision of the words “under God” from the Pledge and do not want longstanding
Ten Commandments monuments removed from public spaces.
To be clear, I am not imagining that ethos possesses the kind of authority that empowers
a judge to decide a case a certain way (call it “E”) just because a sufficient number of people
believe in E. Such an account would be corrosive of any degree of legal autonomy. Rather, I am
suggesting that the authority of ethos empowers a judge who decides E because E is the correct
outcome to justify why E is right in part by appealing to principles and commitments that are
widely shared.
Accordingly, I am not advancing the claim that constitutional law is merely a vessel
through which constitutional culture flows. I am instead conceiving of constitutional law and
constitutional culture as relating dialectically.45 It follows that what I am suggesting does not
prove too much. For example, even if I am right, prayer in schools can still remain
constitutionally out of bounds. When core antiestablishment values are threatened, as they
would be by a reinauguration of prayer in schools, constitutional law appropriate intervenes to
regulate constitutional culture, just as constitutional culture at other times informs the fashioning
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of constitutional law. Moreover, constitutional culture has long been willing to abide, if not
approve, the Court’s prohibition on school prayer.46
The question for progressive constitutionalists in cases like Newdow and Van Orden is
which component of the dialectical relation should be given priority. It seems unlikely that the
answer should always to be the same. Are the words “under God” in the Pledge or a Ten
Commandments monument on the grounds of a statehouse sufficiently threatening to
antiestablishment values that constitutional law should intervene to remove them, much as it did
with school prayer several decades ago? Or, as I have implicitly suggested may be the case, is
the threat to an establishment of religion sufficiently less serious in the Pledge and Ten
Commandments contexts that a constitutional culture which strongly supports public expressions
of both should be allowed to reorient to some extent the doctrinal path of constitutional law?
The problem eludes resolution at a theoretical level, but it ought to be generally
recognized. And it may counsel greater accommodation of religious expression in particular
public settings than progressives might personally wish to allow. Principled adherence to the
ideal of the Living Constitution may require them to tolerate children saying “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance, and it may also require them to tolerate certain Ten Commandments
displays in the public square—even as progressives continue to insist on the constitutional
impertinence of school prayer.
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